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After Edwards: Original Sin and Freedom of the Will
Abstract

Book Summary: Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) is widely regarded as one of the major thinkers in the
Christian tradition and an important and influential figure in American theology. After Jonathan Edwards is a
collection of specially commissioned essays that track his intellectual legacies from the work of his immediate
disciples that formed the New Divinity movement in colonial New England, to his impact upon European
traditions and modern Asia. It is a unique interdisciplinary contribution to the reception of Edwardsian ideas,
with scholars of Edwards being brought together with scholars of New England theology and early American
history to produce a groundbreaking examination of the ways in which New England Theology flourished,
how themes in Edwards's thought were taken up and changed by representatives of the school, and its lasting
influence on the shape of American Christianity.
Chapter Summary: It was the fondest hope of Jonathan Edwards that the Great Awakening of the 1740s was
simply the overture to the Day of Judgment and the thousand-year reign of God directly on earth, the
Millennium, when "religion shall in every respect be uppermost in the world." But instead of the dawning of a
general revival of the Christian church that would cause to "bow the heavens and come down and erect his
glorious kingdom through the earth," what Edwards got was a controversy with his own congregation in
Northampton over church membership, followed by the humiliation of dismissal by that congregation, and
self-imposed demotion to management of a mission to a tribe of Indians whose language he did not speak as
well as oversight of an English congregation whose attention span was, in Edwards's judgment, not up to what
it should have been. It was a tenure punctuated by the onset of the French and Indian War, and wracked by
still more stiff-necked controversies over pastoral issues, although, unlike his situation in Northampton, he
had the powerful sponsorship of the provincial governor, Sir William Pepperell, to protect him. But his
attention never wandered far from the possibility of a renewed visitation of divine grace. [excerpt]
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fondest hope of Jonathan Edwards that the Great Awakening of
the 1740s was simply the overture to the Day of Judgment and the thousandyear reign of God directly on earth, the Millennium, when "religion shall in
every respect be uppermost in the world." But instead of the dawning of a general revival of the Christian church that would cause to "bow the heavens and
come down and erect his glorious kingdom through the earth," what Edwards
got was a controversy with his own congregation in Northampton over church
membership, followed by the humiliation of dismissal by that congregation,
and self-imposed demotion to management of a mission to a tribe of Indians
whose language he did not speak as well as oversight of an English congregation whose attention span was, in Edwards's judgment, not up to what it
should have been. It was a tenure punctuated by the onset of the French and
Indian War, and wracked by still more stiff-necked controversies over pastoral
issues, although, unlike his situation in Northampton, he had the powerful
sponsorship of the provincial governor, Sir William Pepperell, to protect him.
But his attention never wandered far from the possibility of a renewed visitation of divine grace. "I hope to humble his church in New England, and
purify it, and so fit it for yet greater comfort." Only now, his intellectual enthusiasm turned to the rebuke of the spirit that he considered the most lethal to
revival, the lukewarm wraith of "Arminianism"-not the literal teachings of
the seventeenth-century Dutch anti-Calvinist, Jacobus Arminius, but the pallid, free-will, "natural" religion of theologians desperate to placate the spirit of
the Enlightenment. "If some great men that have appeared in our nation had
been as eminent in divinity as they were in philosophy," Edwards complained,
IT WAS THE
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"they would have conquered all Christendom and turned the world upside
down." The temporizing strategy of bargaining away the pure principles of
Christianity, which Edwards never doubted comprehended the pure principles
of Calvinism, was aimed only at appeasing the wolf of Enlightenment unbelief, and it had no power at all to receive the grace of a renewed Awakening,
much less the Millennium; only the unblinking proclamation of Calvinist
orthodoxy had any real strength in its loins. "I think I have found that no discourses have been more remarkably blessed, than those in which the doctrine
of God's absolute sovereignty with regard to the salvation of sinners, and his
just liberty with regard to answered the prayers, or succeeding the pains of
natural men, continuing such, have been insisted on." So, between 1750 and
1757, he managed composition of two landmark treatises in moral philosophy,
Original Sin and Freedom of the Will, which few other eighteenth-century
thinkers could have managed even in the placid Enlightenment confines of
Oxford or Potsdam}
Edwards had always seen himself as a restorer rather than an innovator.
Much as he applied himself as a college student to the Cartesian-style new logic
and the study of Mr. Locke and Sir Isaac Newton, he was "mightily pleased with
the study of the old logic'' -in other words, with the unsullied Calvinist scholasticism of Adrian Heereboord, Francis Burgersdyck, Peter van Maastricht
(whose Theoretic-Practico Theologica was ranked by Edwards as "much better"
than "any other book in the world, excepting the Bible in my opinion"), and
Francis Turretin (whose sure-footedness on "polemical divinity" makes him
ideal ''for one that desires only to be thoroughly versed in controversies"). 2
When he cast his eye back to his period of late-adolescent rebelliousness, it
was not wine, women, or song that constituted the stuff of his wickedness,
but a risque repudiation of Calvinist predestination and "objections against the
doctrine of God's sovereignty." And by the same token, he had not experienced
any satisfactory sense of spiritual renewal until he received "quite another kind
of sense of God's sovereignty than I had then," so that it became "my delight
to approach God, and adore him as a Sovereign God, and ask sovereign mercy
ofhim."> What earned him the fury of the Northampton church was his singleminded attempt to restore the original terms of communicant membership
that were established by the founding generation of Massachusetts, and that
his grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, had loosened during his long tenure as
Northampton's pastor. And what most enchanted him about the brief successes of the Great Awakening was not any of the ways they pointed toward a
new configuration for religion in American societies, but the hope they held
out for turning the clock back a century to the era of New England's first love.
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The Awakening had been a sign "for Arminians to change their principles" and
"relinquish their scheme," and "come and Join with us, and be on our side."4
Yet, if Edwards's aim was repristination, he was more than perceptive
enough to see that the old wine of Calvinism could no longer be poured into
the wineskins of seventeenth-century scholasticism. It is the irony of so many
efforts at intellectual repristination that the greatest and most successful succeed because they deploy, more skillfully than the innovators against whom
they are struggling, the weapons, arguments, strategies, and methods of their
own corrupted day. So it was with Edwards and the great treatises on God's
unconditional election and man's total depravity. Edwards might have chosen, as his contemporary Jonathan Dickinson did, simply to hurl scholastic
syllogisms built on biblical authorities at the many heads of Enlightenment
unbelief and indeterminism.' But anyone who takes up Freedom of the Will or
Original Sin in the expectation of following just another tedious exposition of
Calvinism's favorite biblical proofs (on the assumption that a biblical proof
carries its own authority) is in for more than a mild surprise. The argument
of Freedom of the Will is based on psychology and analysis of language, not
exegesis; the argument of Original Sin is based on observation and analysis of
nature. And the result, produced in the interest of restoring Calvinism, may
have ended up producing something significantly different from the restoration Edwards imagined.
The Enlightenment posed difficulties for Calvinism in other ways, since
it was a movement that simultaneously embraced freedom of action, reason,
and optimism, as well as cynicism, fanaticism, and the most iron-gloved forms
of determinism. It was hatched from the struggle to replace a universe governed by animation and providence with one governed by predictable physical
laws, but only at the risk of making those laws as inexorable as the rule of
providence it wanted to leave behind. Julien de la Mettrie insisted that "the
human body is a machine which winds its own spring." The fact that it does
its own winding does not make it free: "We think we are, and in fact are, good
men, only as we are gay or brave; everything depends on the way our machine
is running.... In vain you fall back on the power of the will, since for one
order that the will gives, it bows a hundred times to the yoke." Even Benjamin
Franklin could at once extol rank determinism and then conclude, not that it
was wrong, but that it was a subject inconvenient to drag into polite conversation. There was no greater mistake than to "suppose ourselves to be, in the
common sense of the Word, Free Agents," but the practical effect of telling this
to people, especially in front of the servants, "appeared abominable. "6
What this division of mind testified to was the need to reconcile the natural regularity of observed physical laws with the ethical need to hold human
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beings personally accountable for their actions, even as it was to acknowledge that human beings are not exempt from universal application of those
laws. Those who imagined that, by freeing themselves from the arbitrariness
of an intelligent Providence, they were delivering themselves into a kind of
self-starting, self-acting liberty could assert as much as they liked that they
now stood on a separate and higher plane of indeterminism and free action
than those poor deluded souls who still toiled under the "soft determinism"
of inability, depravity, and divine manipulation of all events. The uncomfortable question that sat beside this newly won self-possession was whether indeterminism's overconfident promoters had unwittingly sold themselves into a
more rigid and exacting form of control in which either (1) a faceless physical
mechanism made all ethical restraints disappear like a mirage or (2) a rudderless indeterminism made all ethical restraints meaningless. These latter-day
"Arminians" had, in effect, used their supposed free will to dig themselves into
a trench that they could not think how to escape. And so it became Edwards's
task to show them that Calvinism, or at least Calvinism's form of providential determinism, did not abolish moral accountability and restraint but was
in fact the only guarantor of it. He did not offer Calvinism as a rebuke to the
Enlightenment's optimism (which, by contrast, is what Dickinson was prepared to do) but as a solution to its ethical despair.
Edwards seems to have regarded this as a double-barreled opportunity,
since it so nicely tied together the ambition of a provincial intellectual to speak
to a significant thought problem, and in a way that the metropolitan centers
of the British empire would have to notice, with his concern to refound New
England on the unsullied principles of its founding. This was, in the largest sense, the project of his life; ideas and arguments on both original sin
and free will show up in Edwards's notebooks as early as 1729.7 By the mid1730s, he had already worked out his fundamental critique of the "meaning of
the words freedom or liberty." But the actual beginnings of Freedom of the Will
and Original Sin probably date from 1748, when he simultaneously hatched
the plan "of publishing something against some of the Arminian tenets" and
acquired a copy for himself of John Taylor's Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin
Proposed to Free and Candid Examination (1740), which would become the target of convenience for his own study of that name in 1758. A little more than a
year later, in a letter to his prize pupil, Joseph Bellamy, Edwards sketched out
the kernel of what became the central arguments of Freedom of the Will. But
his determination to move his edition of David Brainerd's journal into print,
along with the tempest of his dismissal from Northampton in 1750, pushed
work on these projects to a far comer of his mind, and it was not until1754
that Edwards was at last ready with a manuscript for his Boston publisher,
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Samuel Kneeland, to have "printed in ... new types" which would be "better
than any he now has." 8
Edwards began his Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions ofthe Freedom

of the Will which is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice,
Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame by adopting an unexpectedly secular definition of "the will." Rather than speak of it as a separate "faculty"
within the mind, as the Protestant scholastics of the seventeenth century did,
Edwards identified the will in the fashion of locke's Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1690), as "that by which the mind chooses anything" or "that
by which the soul either chooses or refuses." He did not intend by this to suggest that the mind ruled the will, in the manner beloved of Thomistic intellectualists; there was no complicated transaction in the mind, ending with a
rational conclusion that the will then executes. Minds, after all, cannot deliberate between perceived alternatives without willing or choosing actually getting
mixed up in the process of what intellectualists mistake for a purely intellectual sequence. Thinking itself is a ceaseless interaction between preferences
and perceptions. Let the mind perceive something it prefers-something that
acts as a "motive"-and the will at once reaches out for it. "And God has so
made and established the human nature, the soul being united to a body in
proper state, that the soul preferring or choosing such an immediate exertion or alteration of the body, such an alteration instantaneously follows." The
connection between perception and volition is in fact so close and so instantaneous that one might as well give up all hope of finding a line between the
two, and admit that "the will always is as the greatest apparent good is." Not
the "good" in some rational, abstract understanding of the word, but "of the
same import with 'agreeable.' "9
This definition chalked out the operating boundaries for Edwards's notion
of willing. Minds perceive objects, which they either desire or do not desire,
the desiring being a part of the perceiving; wills are a means toward putting the man in possession of that desired object. The will does not deliberate
between willing and not willing that desire; the will is the desire. The question of free will is therefore not whether wills have an independent review
power over minds, but whether wills have an unobstructed path to realizing the mind's preferences. Hence, the real problem involved in free will or
determinism is not whether the will is hindered from choosing-this it does
automatically-but merely whether it has the physical liberty to acquire the
object of the mind's desiring. "Liberty" is only "that power and opportunity
for one to do and conduct as he will ... according to his choice." What made
a person free was not a matter of how he or she came to "prefer" one thing
rather than another, because he will do this as soon as he perceives that thing,
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but whether the person is restrained from acquiring what he is willing. "Let
the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and
there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the
man is fully and perfectly free .... "10
But if this was the case, on what ground does the modem "Arminian" complain against a sovereign God who ordains every event that comes to pass?
Indeterminists would like to have the will free to determine itself, but this is
not what wills do: "The advocates for this notion of the freedom of the will
speak of a certain sovereignty in the will, whereby it has power to determine its
own volitions." This is to mistake what the will actually is. Wills do not choose
to will, because that would be a tautology, and "every free act of choice" would
have to be "determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act." Wills
reach out spontaneously as the mind responds to certain motives, and it is no
diminution of the will's real freedom to say that it is ruled by those motives.
That's what the will is there for. And so the trap closes, because if something
outside the will does legitimately determine the will, then the "Arminian"
withers, since it is no diminution of the will's scope of activity if God plants
"motives" in the path of minds that minds prefer and which then instruct
the will to apprehend. And the Calvinist, by the same reasoning, flourishes,
since the connection between mental perception and willing is so immediate
that no one ever wills against what he desires, or "chooses one thing before
another, when at the very same instant it is perfectly indifferent with respect
to each!" Hence, there is no reason the perceiving individual should not consider that he chooses freely, or is not morally accountable for the choice, since
it proceeds from his own desires.u
Of course, one could object that this means Calvinists have exchanged an idea
of God as a master who rigidly manipulates his creatures like puppets for an idea
of God as gamester who dangles meat in front of starving dogs. The dogs might
be technically free, but it did nothing to diminish the necessity of the result. But
as far as Edwards was concerned, the problem was not in the necessity of the
result, but in the kind of necessity involved when minds apprehended motives
and moved at once to act on them, because not all versions of necessity were
hostile to moral freedom and accountability. When God decrees a certain action,
the action becomes necessary. But actions can become necessary in one of two
very different ways: God actually could manipulate someone into doing what he
wants, with the person all the while kicking and screaming in protest because of
wanting to do something else. This is the concept of necessity most commonly
used "from our childhood." But it is by no means the only one, or even the most
comprehensive. An act, after all, can become necessary if someone already has
a certain psychological inclination toward it. There is, after all, a measure of
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predictability in human behavior; we do not live randomly, and the more intense
our inclination toward a sort ofbehavior, the more likely we will act on it. 12
Edwards called the necessity that involves force natural necessity, and he
cheerfully admitted that those who are compelled to act under the force of
natural necessity cannot be held morally accountable for what they do: "By
'natural necessity' ... I mean such necessity as men are under through the
force of natural causes." The other necessity, which arises from our own inclinations, Edwards called moral necessity. Nobody is actually forcing anyone to
do things by moral necessity. So, when someone wills to do something it is
morally necessary to do, the person is not actually having a string pulled. But
"moral necessity may be as absolute as natural necessity," since it consists
"in the opposition or want of inclination ... through a defect of motives, or
prevalence of contrary motives." People are then acting on the basis of what
they really want and thus can be held morally liable for the consequences of
choice. In fact, the greater the force of an evil inclination on someone's actions,
the more accountable the person is, precisely for having all the physical power
needed to do otherwise. If what we possess are sinful inclinations, they will
incline us to sin all the time, without God having to force anything to happen.
Under the self-imposed sway of moral necessity, there is a moral inability to
do anything other than sin. Yet, none of this happens from God forcing us to
sin; that would be a natural necessity and would give us an excuse. We actually
possess all the natural ability we could ever want not to sin:
In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he
has it in his choice .... It can't be truly said, according to the ordinary
use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious,
can't hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to shew his
neighbor kindness.
The probability of the "malicious man" not behaving in a malicious manner
takes unlikelihood to the vanishing point, and that is necessity enough to
please whatever Calvinists might want from necessity; but it also places the
blame and origin for the malice squarely on the malicious man himself/3
Translated into practical terms, what this meant was that people could
not shelter themselves from the call to repentance and conversion (as they
had for generations in New England) behind such pious fig leaves as the
Half-Way Covenant or the plea that they were gradually working their way
through their depravity by the means of grace (prayer, using the sacraments,
reading the Bible, listening to sermons, coming under conviction of sin,
and so forth, in slow order). Human beings were depraved, totally, and this
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ensured that they lacked the moral ability to do anything but sin; but they
also had arms and legs and lips and a brain-natural ability-and could use
them all if they chose to bow down in the dust and abase themselves before
God, and they should do so at once; if they did not, they had no one to blame
but themselves when they came to Judgment. Edwards had thus created not
only a justification of the ways of Calvin to the eighteenth century but a psychology of crisis in which people were encouraged at once to decide, decide,
decide.
It was necessary to the overall strategy of a religious Awakening to insist
that the ultimate problem was not the will itself, since the will reached out
for only what the perceiving mind desired anyway. That the will performed
according to a predictable-and actually foreordained-pattern satisfied only
the demand of Calvinism that all events be seen as a divinely ordered sequence
that nevertheless allowed the human subject more than enough "freedom" to
be held morally accountable. But there would be no impetus in favor of an
Awakening unless what the human subject was being held accountable for
was deeply, morally culpable in the eyes of God. Standing by itself, Freedom of
the Will might end up proving little more than Thomas Hobbes, Lord Kames,
or Anthony Collins had proven about the will: that it was not self-originating,
self-sovereign, or "free." It was because human nature was profoundly and
horribly depraved that the need to understand how the will operated suddenly
became an urgent problem. And this was the task Edwards took upon himself
in the waning months of his tenure at the Stockbridge mission, in The Great
Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended.
Edwards actually had two problems to work out in Original Sin, one of
them fairly easy in practical terms and the other hard enough to have broken
the heads of centuries' worth of Christian theologians. In the first case, even in
the sunny reasonableness of the eighteenth century it was not difficult to convince people that the human race teemed with moral turpitude. What Edwards
had to prove, however, was that this turpitude was not the accidental result of a
free will that might otherwise, with a little more education or encouragement,
have been avoided, but an irremediable corruption of human nature itself.
When he spoke of original sin, he meant "the innate sinful depravity of the
heart . .. that the heart of man is naturally of a corrupt and evil disposition."
What was more of a challenge was, in the second case, showing how God
was as much a sovereign in the beginnings and continuance of that depravity
without at the same time being responsible for it himself. He had to explain
and justify, in theological parlance, "not only the depravity of nature, but the
imputation of Adam's first sin" by God to all of his "posterity." Enlightenment
optimists might want to get rid of original sin; Enlightenment theists were
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less likely to deny that humanity was sinful, but they were more anxious to
shift the blame for it from God's decree to human free will.14
Original Sin devotes much more of its substance to biblical explanation
and an appeal to human experience than Freedom of the Will, in large measure because this was not difficult to do. "The Scriptures are so very express,"
argued Edwards, in asserting there was little question that "all mankind;
all flesh, all the world, every man living, are guilty of sin." If sin was not
"a thing belonging to the race of mankind, as if it were a property of the species," then why do we have "such descriptions, all over the Bible, or man,
and the sons of men! Why should man be so continually spoken of as evil,
carnal, perverse, deceitful, and desperately wicked, if all men are by nature
as perfectly innocent, and free from any propensity to evil, as Adam was the
first moment of his creation"? The historical record was equally clear on
the pervasiveness of human folly, since "if we consider the various successive parts and period of the duration of the world, it will, if possible, be yet
more evident, that vastly the greater part of mankind have in all ages been
of a wicked character." Even the "great advances in learning and philosophic
knowledge" in his own day merely turned people more to "profaneness, sensuality and debauchery." But Edwards was not content to assert that human
beings make moral mistakes; he thought it was necessary to prove not just
that people sin but that there is "a prevailing propensity to that issue ... that
all fail of keeping the law perfectly ... to such an imperfection of obedience, as always without fail comes to pass." It was true-and irrelevantthat human behavior is a mix of good and bad; the fundamental problem
was with the set of the saw itself, and whether "he preponderates to, in the
frame of his heart, and state of his nature ... a state of sin, guiltiness and
abhorrence in the sight of God." The clincher of Edwards's insistence on the
root-and-branch origins of evil was the fact of death: "Death is spoken of in
Scripture as the chief of calamities, the most extreme and terrible of all those
natural evils which come on mankind in this world." Only the existence of
"a perverse and vile disposition" was in any way commensurate with God's
decision to "chastise them with great severity, and even to kill them, to keep
them in order." 1'
But Edwards's relentless pushing on the biblical and historical reality of
evil in human nature only pressed the discussion in another direction, and
that was the question of how this evil came to take up residence in human
hearts, and who was responsible for the calamity. Neither Edwards nor his
opponents in the eighteenth century had much hesitation in fingering Adam,
the original parent of the human race, with having begun the slide into
the moral abyss. What they could not be reconciled on was what influence
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Adam's transgression exerted on his subsequent progeny's instinct for evil.
"Arminians" were likely to insist that Adam's sin in the Garden of Eden was
certainly reprehensible; but what did it have to do with anyone else? Was it fair
to suppose that Adam, in an exercise of moral genetics, passed on to his helpless descendents a "depravity gene"? It was now Edwards's turn to be hoisted
on his own petard, since if Adam's fall was responsible for "implanting any bad
principle, or infUsing any corrupt taint" into the human race, it would constitute precisely the sort of natural necessity that, in Freedom of the Will, Edwards
explained would cancel out moral accountability. Edwards's solution was not
elegant: "Adam's nature became corrupt, without God's implanting or infusing any evil thing into his nature." God stepped back from Adam, allowing
him to fall of his own moral weight; thereafter, God proceeds to deal "with
Adam as the head of his posterity ... and treating them as one ... as having
all sinned in him." Adam, in short, acts as a representative, or federal head, of
the human race, and when he falls, then just as God "withdrew his spiritual
communion and his vital gracious influence from the common head, so he
withholds the same from all the members, as they come into existence ... and
so become wholly corrupt, as Adam did." This means that "the derivation of
the pollution and guilt of past sins ... depends on an arbitrary divine constitution," rather than an infected spiritual organism. Not some "oneness in
created beings, whence qualities and relations are derived from past experience," but God's "divine constitution"-his determination to treat the universe
as a government, and his relations to his creatures as legal ones-was what
prompted God to regard all the heirs of Adam as depraved. And they confirm
God's rightness in so treating them, not "merely because God imputes it to
them," but because they actually proceed to act sinfully, so that Adam's sin
becomes "truly and properly theirs." 16
This last argument was a surprise, coming from someone as focused on
restoration of pure Calvinism as was Edwards, since Calvinism in its purest
seventeenth-century expressions in the Synod of Dordt and the Westminster
Assembly had laid down that inheritance of a depraved substance was precisely what made people sin, and that redemption from that sin came through
the compensatory imputation of the merits and righteousness ofJesus Christ.
But Edwards's yearning to restart the Awakenings of the 1730s and 1740s, and
his eagerness to rinse away any suggestion that sinners suffered under a natural necessity to sin that prevented repentance and renewal, overcame whatever
hesitations he might have felt about tampering with the strict formularies of
the Calvinist fathers. Still, it would not be Edwards, but Edwards's disciples of
the q6os-Joseph Bellamy and Samuel Hopkins-who would develop this
departure into a full-blown embrace of a governmental view of atonement and
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the jettisoning of the classic Protestant understanding of redemption through
an imputed righteousness.'7
Measuring the long-term "impact" of Original Sin and "Edwards on the
Will" is somewhat like measuring the impact of a meteorite, in that the sig·
nificance of the event overshadows the strictly measurable evidence. The
great nineteenth-century Scottish divine Thomas Chalmers studied "Jonathan
Edwards' Treatise on Free Will ... with such ardour that he seemed to regard
nothing else, and would scarcely talk of anything else," since it induced in
Chalmers's mind "the sublime conception of the Godhead as that eternal,
all-pervading energy by which this vast and firmly-knit succession was originated and sustained, and into a very rapture of admiration and delight." Sir
James Mackintosh, another nineteenth-century Scot and a prominent jurist,
lauded Edwards as "the metaphysician of America," whose "power of subtile argument" was "perhaps unmatched, certainly unsurpassed among men";
Mackintosh devoted the most "disputatious" part of his university education at
Aberdeen in the 178os to "the perusal ofJonathan Edwards' book on Free-Will."
Mackintosh's classmate, the Leicester-born dissenter Robert Hall, "celebrated
Jonathan Edwards, in his treatise on the Will, and the distinction [of natural
and moral necessity] defended with all the depth and precision peculiar to that
amazing genius." Samuel Lorenzo Knapp, the pioneer critic of American literature, thought that Freedom of the Will set Edwards's "reputation to an equality
with the first metaphysicians ofhis age in this country and in Europe." Even
Edwards's most vehement American critic, Rowland G. Hazard, conceded that
"the work of Edwards 'On the Will,' marks it as ... the great bulwark of ... the
necessarians." As to their creed, "the severest scrutiny of their opponents has
discovered in it no vulnerable point. The soundness of the premises, and the
cogency of the logic, by which he reaches his conclusions, seem indeed to be
very generally admitted, so that, almost by common consent, his positions
are deemed impregnable, and the hope of subverting them by direct attack
abandoned." 18
But if Edwardsian-style revivalism was an important means for firing up
interest in the renewal of Calvinism, it was also a poor instrument for sustaining it. The demand for immediate repentance was supposed to infuse
new virtue back into public life through renewed individuals; unhappily, it
might just as easily convince renewed individuals to have nothing further to
do with the sinfulness of their surrounding neighbors. Edwardsian revivalism was, at the end of the day, a reflection of the old Puritan weakness for
separatism: the revivals called people to repentance, but they also called them
out of society, out of their normal relations, out of their everyday moral lives,
to participate in an intensely demanding but quite other-worldly version of
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Protestant Christianity. The very fact that a revival was judged necessary at
all was a judgment on the failures of the regular churches and the impurities
of conventional society; its logical end was to tum people into come-outers
of various sorts and inflate a radical individualism. To maintain momentum
and influence, and to maintain it broadly in society, there had to be a second
answer to the problem of religion's role in leading American life, and that
would come from the nineteenth-century academic moral philosophers and
John Witherspoon's Scottish philosophy of common sense.'9

